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Judicial Intervention in the
Preelection Stage of the Initiative
Process: A Change of Policy by
the California Supreme Court
The initiative process in California allows the voters to propose
and enact laws directly without using the elected representative system
of lawmaking. The statutory initiative, like any other form of legisla-
tion, is subject to judicial review to ensure compliance with the para-
mount law of the state and federal constitutions, 2 but unlike other
forms of legislation, this review can occur at either of two stages
in the lawmaking process .3 Judicial review of an initiative measure
can occur after the proposal has been submitted to the electorate and
enacted into law by a majority vote.4 This postelection review is
analogous to judicial review of legislatively enacted laws. In addi-
tion, the initiative process is subject to judicial review during the pro-
posal, or preelection, stage.' Preelection review, unique to the initiative
form of lawmaking, can create barriers to initiative measures not pre-
sent in a postelection review of an initiative or the review of legisla-
tion passed by the legislature. 6
The influence of the initiative process on California law cannot be
disputed. Initiative measures recently have been responsible for change
in many areas including taxation 7 and criminal justice.8 Legislative
reform by initiative has proven to be a powerful tool for a dissatisfied
electorate. The process, however, may be in danger of erosion due
to the most recent decision by the California Supreme Court involv-
ing preelection review. This author contends that the decision in
1. See Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 1717, 1719-24 (1966). See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, §8; CAL. ELEC. CODE
§§3500-3579. The initiative operates as an independent method of lawmaking by bypassing the
legislature entirely and placing the measure directly on the ballot.
2. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1724.
3. See id. at 1724-29.
4. See id. at 1724.
5. See id. at 1724-29.
6. Id.
7. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Board of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
8. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
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Legislature v. Deukmejian,9 if given full effect in future cases, could
limit the power of the initiative process substantially.
The focus of this comment will be upon the standard of review
used by California courts to determine if a preelection review of an
initiative measure is justified. The standard requires that opponents
of an initiative must make "a clear showing of invalidity"'" to the
court before a preelection review is granted. Specifically, the origin
of this standard in the courts, ' the adoption of the standard by the
California Supreme Court,' 2 and the most recent expansion and ap-
plication of the standard in Legislature v. Deukmejian'3 will be discuss-
ed. This most recent use of the standard demonstrates that the pre-
sent criteria used by the supreme court are inadequate to maintain
the maximum effectiveness of the initiative process." This author con-
tends that the current standard allows the courts to exercise preelec-
tion review in too many cases.
Excessive preelection review of initiative measures impairs the in-
itiative process in three respects. First, preelection review restricts one
of the fundamental purposes of the initiative power, which is to give
citizens who feel their elected representatives have failed to address
their concerns, a method of voicing their dissatisfaction.' Second,
under the present standard, proponents of an initiative measure can-
not anticipate the criteria that will be used to determine if "a clear
showing of invalidity" could be made.'" Proponents should be able
to ascertain the standards that will be applied by the court in the
event of a preelection challenge. The proponents then could embark
on the task of drafting and qualifying the measure knowing the risks
of preelection litigation. Third, a preelection review requires that an
often vast and complex factual record be prepared by the proponents
to counter the allegation of a "clear showing of invalidity."' 7 Pro-
ponents and the courts in a preelection setting may not have the
resources nor the time necessary to defend the measure properly
because the factual record must be prepared and argued, often not
in a trial setting, but in an appellate forum.' 8 Appellate courts are
not equipped to try issues of fact. The normal procedure in an
9. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
10. Id. at 666, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
11. See infra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 91-142 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 109-42 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 109-42 and accompanying text.
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appellate court is an argument at a calendar hearing which is quite
unlike the fact finding process of a trial court.
This author will propose a strict standard of preelection review that
would remedy the problems outlined above. This proposed standard,
in addition to requiring a clear showing of invalidity, would defer
judicial review of an initiative measure until after approval by the
voters unless the "clear showing of invalidity" can be demonstrated
using the authority of previously decided cases which addressed the
constitutionality of the measure proposed by the initiative. This stan-
dard would maximize the power of the voters to address their con-
cerns while still allowing the court to prevent submission of frivolous
proposals to the electorate. Proponents would be able to plan initiatives
around existing case law, yet present novel approaches to remedy
legislative inaction or to counter undesired legislative action in areas
of voter concern. Finally, the proposed standard would obviate the
necessity of assembling a complex factual record in appellate courts
and would allow the resolution of issues of fact in a trial court after
the election has occurred.
Discussion in this comment will focus on preelection review by the
California appellate courts using original jurisdiction power to accept
constitutional challenges to statewide initiative measures that have
qualified procedurally for the ballot. This comment also will be limited
to judicial review of initiatives proposing statutory measures and not
those proposing constitutional amendments for which judicial review
is more limited. This author proposes a return to the traditional
high level of judicial deference accorded initiative measures through
the use of a strict standard of review. The most recent application
of the standard has lowered the level of judicial deference with the
resulting expansion of the scope of preelection review. A discussion
of the origins of the traditional standard is therefore necessary.
ORIGIN OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The origin of the clear showing of invalidity standard used by the
Deukmejian court can be traced to Gayle v. Hamm, 9 a 1972 Second
District Court of Appeal decision. Gayle was not the first decision
in which the principles incorporated in the standard were applied,
but the opinion was the first to enunciate the standard. In 1982, the
Gayle standard was adopted by the supreme court in Brosnahan v.
Eu. 0 Brosnahan, in turn, was cited as the authority for the standard
19. 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1972).
20. 31 Cal. 3d 1, 641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982).
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used in Legislature v. Deukmejian,2 but the original source is Gayle.
To understand the impact of the change in the standard by the
Deukmejian court, Gayle and Brosnahan necessarily must be considered
first.
A. Gayle v. Hamm
Gayle v. Hamm involved an initiative that dealt with the ability
of Ventura County to operate an airport within the boundaries of
any unincorporated city located within the county.22 Proponents of
the initiative gathered the required signatures and presented them to
the election officials for certification and submission to the voters.
The case was brought before the California Court of Appeal for the
Second District after the election officials refused to count and cer-
tify the number of signatures on the initiative petitions and place the
measure on the ballot. 23 The dispute arose because the county counsel
had informed election officials that even if enacted, the measure would
be invalid.2" Both the trial court and court of appeal agreed that a
peremptory writ of mandate should be issued to compel the election
clerk to proceed.2" The court of appeal, relying on two previous
California Supreme Court decisions, agreed and declined to grant a
preelection review to determine the validity of the proposal.2 6
The Gayle court combined principles from both of those cases to
formulate the standard of review to be used in determining the pro-
priety of this preelection review. The first decision relied upon by
the court wAs the 1948 case of McFadden v. Jordan.21 In that case,
the court removed an initiative from the ballot based on the finding
that the initiative proposed to revise, not amend, the state
constitution.28 The McFadden court found that since the constitution
contained an explicit provision giving the requirements needed for a
constitutional revision, which could not be satisfied by the initiative
process, any attempt by initiative to revise the constitution would
clearly make the initiative, if enacted, invalid.2 9
The second case relied upon by the Gayle court was a 1967 supreme
21. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 666, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
22. Gayle, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 252-54, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
23. Id. at 252, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 252, 258, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 630, 634.
26. Id. at 255, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
27. 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
28. Id. at 331, 196 P.2d at 788.
29. Id. at 331-32, 196 P.2d at 788.
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court case, Farley v. Healey. ° In Farley, an initiative measure was
proposed that the City and County of San Francisco adopt an anti-
Vietnam War resolution. 3' The initiative was challenged on the ground
that a foreign policy resolution was beyond the scope of the Charter
of the City and County of San Francisco. 32 The supreme court declined
to remove the initiative from the ballot because no "compelling show-
ing" had been established justifying interference with the initiative
power.13
The Gayle court then combined the standards from McFadden and
Farley to hold that "the court will not interfere with the reserved
right of the people to propose and enact legislation absent a 'com-
pelling showing,' i.e., a showing that is 'clear beyond question' that
the proposed ordinance would be invalid if enacted. ' 34 The court ap-
plied this standard to the facts and held that the requisite showing
had not been made, and consequently, a preelection review was not
justified. 35 Both the standard and the language of Gayle were later
adopted by the supreme court in Brosnahan v. Eu.36
B. Brosnahan v. Eu
The initiative at issue in Brosnahan was entitled "The Victims' Bill
of Rights." This measure was challenged to prevent submission to
the voters on three grounds. 37 The first contention was that the in-
itiative proponents had failed to comply procedurally with statutory
provisions regarding the number of valid signatures required to qualify
a measure for the ballot. 38 The majority of the opinion was devoted
to this issue with the court concluding that the requisite number of
valid signatures had been obtained to qualify the measure. Second,
the measure was attacked on the ground that it violated an explicit
constitutional provision limiting an initiative measure to a single
subject.3 9 Third, the initiative was challenged as being a revision of
the constitution rather than an amendment. ° The court did not ad-
dress the substantive issues presented by the second and third objec-
30. 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967).
31. Id. at 326, 431 P.2d at 651, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 327, 431 P.2d at 652, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
34. Gayle, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 255, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
35. Id.
36. Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 4, 641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
37. Id. at 2, 641 P.2d at 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
38. Id. at 2-4, 641 P.2d at 200-01, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01.
39. Id. at 2, 641 P.2d at 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
40. Id.
1131
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
tions. Instead, the court declined to pass on these issues because peti-
tioners had failed to make "a clear showing of invalidity."'" Both
of the substantive issues were dismissed summarily in two sentences.
The court, citing Gayle as authority, 2 gave no reason why the stan-
dard had not been met other than to dismiss the issues with the follow-
ing language:
We do not reach the other issues raised by petitioners. As we have
frequently observed, it is usually more appropriate to review con-
stitutional and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative
measures after an election rather than to disrupt the electoral pro-
cess by preventing the exercise of the people's franchise, in the
absence of some clear showing of invalidity. 3
The court did no more than state the traditional concept of judicial
deference given to initiative measures and the basic standard. Because
the Brosnahan holding was unaccompanied by detailed reasoning of
the court, no framework for making future decisions was created.
The next major case to address the issue of the propriety of preelec-
tion review and to apply the "clear showing of invalidity" standard
was Legislature v. Deukmejian.
C. Legislature v. Deukmejian
The most recent application of the standard by the California
Supreme Court for determining the propriety of preelection review
was in a 1983 case, Legislature v. Deukmejian." At issue was the validity
of the Sebastiani Initiative, a measure proposing a reapportionment
plan for the voting districts of the state.45 To understand the impact
of this case upon the preelection standard of review and future in-
itiative measures in general, a brief examination of the reapportion-
ment struggle for this decade in California is necessary.
The California Constitution requires that after the publication of
the federal census each decade, the voting districts of the state be
reapportioned to reflect any population changes. 6 In 1981, following
the release of the federal census figures, the California Legislature
passed a reapportionment plan (hereinafter Plan I)." Some citizens,
dissatisfied with Plan I, circulated petitions to require that Plan I
41. Id. at 4, 641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
45. Id. at 663, 669 P.2d at 18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
46. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, §6.
47. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 667-68, 669 P.2d at 21-22, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785-86.
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be subjected to a referendum vote which would allow the voters to
approve or disapprove of the plan. Enough signatures were obtained
to qualify the referendum for the June 1982 election, and the supreme
court allowed the districts drawn by the legislature to be provisional-
ly used for the June 1982 elections." In the 1982 election, Plan I
was rejected by the voters and invalidated."
In response, the legislature enacted a second plan (hereinafter Plan
II). Plan II was never subjected to a referendum vote, such as the
one which invalidated Plan I, because it was signed into law as an
urgency statute by outgoing Governor Brown.5" Under the California
Constitution, legislation signed into law as an urgency measure is
exempt from the referendum process.5 Opponents of both the
legislative plans alleged that Plan II, now enacted into law, was
substantially the same as Plan I, which the voters had rejected at
the polls and was, therefore, not representative of the wishes of the
electorate. 2 One avenue of recourse chosen by those opposing this
second legislative plan was the proposal of a third reapportionment
scheme using the initiative process.
This third reapportionment plan was the Sebastiani Initiative, named
after one of the primary proponents of the measure. Initiative peti-
tions were circulated, and enough signatures were gathered to qualify
the proposal for the ballot. Governor George Deukmejian called a
special election to submit the initiative to the electorate. 53 This special
election was never held, however, because the California Supreme
Court found, in a preelection review, that the measure was
unconstitutional. 54
In holding that preelection review was proper, the court concluded
that the petitioners, who sought to prevent the election, had made
the requisite showing of the invalidity of the proposed initiative. 55
Generally, the court will not undertake a preelection review of an
initiative measure that is attacked on constitutional grounds, prefer-
ring instead a postelection review if the measure passes. The court
quoted the Brosnahan standard as the standard to be applied in deter-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See CAL. CoNsT. art. 11, §9.
52. Brief for Respondent at 18, Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17,
194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
53. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 664, 669 P.2d at 19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
54. Id. at 658-81, 669 P.2d at 18-33, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 782-97.
55. Id.
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mining the propriety of the preelection review. 6 In addition, the court
stated that the principle of deferring constitutional challenges until
after the election, unless a clear showing of invalidity is made, is a
salutary principle and "where appropriate we adhere to it."" However,
the court apparently determined that the circumstances in Legislature
v. Deukmejian were not appropriate to warrant deference.
In the ensuing explanation of why the circumstances in the case
before the court were inappropriate for the traditional high level of
judicial deference accorded initiative measures, the court added a new
dimension to the "clear showing of invalidity" standard. The court
referred to two circumstances which affected the determination of the
propriety of a preelection review in Deukmejian by lowering the level
of deference given to the initiative measure. The first circumstance
identified by the court was the considerable monetary cost to the tax-
payers of holding a special election. 8 The election was to be held
for the sole purpose of voting on the Sebastiani Initiative. The pro-
jected cost of the election was $15 million. 9 In the opinion of the
court, the substantial cost of the special election warranted
intervention. 60
The second circumstance relied upon by the court as grounds for
justifying preelection review was the potential problem that election
officials, candidates, and supporters would encounter if the final deci-
sion on reapportionment were deferred until after the special election. 6'
All of these groups could not prepare for the upcoming general elec-
tion in June 1984 without knowing what voting districts the reappor-
tionment plan would establish. The court decided that the stability
of the system would be jeopardized if the validity of the initiative
were not determined promptly. 62
In sum, the court balanced these circumstances against the historical
judicial deference accorded initiative measures, and allowed the perceiv-
ed consequences to weigh significantly in the determination by the
court to exercise preelection review. The court qualified the "clear
showing of invalidity" standard, and thus established a two pronged
test. The first prong is the traditional approach used by the Califor-
nia courts and is a deferential standard of review. In the absence
56. Id. at 666, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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of any special circumstances and resulting- serious consequences, the
court will give the long-established high level of deference to the in-
itiative process. If this level of deference is applied, the clear show-
ing of invalidity standard is difficult for opponents of an initiative
to meet because the court will not strictly scrutinize the issue of in-
validity. This usually allows the initiative process to proceed undisturb-
ed by preelection constitutional challenges. The court, however, still
has the ability to review the measure after submission to the voters,
unless an adverse vote makes the issue moot.
The second prong of the new two part standard, providing for
judicial review of initiative measures when justified by special cir-
cumstances, appears for the first time in Legislature v. Deukmejian.
This prong accords less deference to the initiative process in the ap-
plication of the "clear showing of invalidity" standard. If the court
determines that special circumstances exist which would result in serious
consequences to the public, then the level of deference traditionally
given initiative measures is lowered. The resulting effect is to decrease
the showing of invalidity required to justify a preelection review. Both
prongs of this new expanded standard, however, still require that a
determination of the showing of invalidity be made. This is the area
in which the law is least clear.
DETERMINATION OF A CLEAR SHOWING OF INVALIDITY
The traditional level of deference given the initiative process rarely
has required actual application of the clear showing of invalidity stan-
dard. The courts simply have exercised restraint and considered judicial
interference an unwarranted limitation on the initiative process in vir-
tually all cases.63 They have relied on this general deference and not
on the actual application of the standard to determine the propriety
of preelection review.64 This controlling judicial deference to the in-
itiative process has forestalled the development of case law specifical-
ly explaining the application of the clear showing of invalidity
requirement.
An example is the treatment by the court of the constitutional issues
in Brosnahan. The issue concerning the fulfillment of the procedural
qualification requirements of California Constitution article II, sec-
tion 8, comprised the bulk of the opinion while the substantive
63. See, e.g., Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966);
Wind v. Hite, 58 Cal. 2d 415, 374 P.2d 643, 24 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1962).
64. Id.
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challenges of invalidity were dismissed summarily.65 The court simply
stated that the better course would be to wait and review the substan-
tive issues of constitutional validity after the election because postelec-
tion review is more appropriate than preelection review in challenges
to initiative measures. 66 No reasoning on the assertions of invalidity
can be found in the majority opinion. 67 Only an assumption can be
made that the requisite showing was not made since a preelection
review was not granted.
The determination of whether a showing of invalidity has been made
obviously depends upon the subject matter of the initiative measure
before the court. A few decisions, however, have enunciated two
general principles that provide some guidance in the application of
the standard. In McFadden, the only case in the thirty-two year period
before Deukmejian to find that a clear showing of invalidity had been
made," the court stressed two points in holding that the standard
had been met. First, the invalidity of the initiative measure rested
on an express constitutional provision.6 9 The California Constitution
contains explicit guidelines for a revision of the constitution, and while
the initiative at issue in McFadden was entitled a constitutional amend-
ment, the actual effect would have been a revision."0 The initiative
measure could not satisfy the explicit constitutional requirements and,
therefore, was invalid. 71
The second general principle emphasized in the reasoning of the
McFadden decision was that preelection review and invalidation must
be predicated on the authority of existing case law.72 The McFadden
court held that the standard had been met because the constitutional
"provisions are not only clear in themselves but have heretofore, in
controlling aspects, been the subject of scrutiny and exposition by
the court." ' 73 This language clearly shows the reliance of the court
on precedent to determine the showing of invalidity.
This second general principle was incorporated in the decision of
the Gayle court.74 The court referred to the Farley opinion for elucida-
65. Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 4, 641 P.2d at 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 681, 669 P.2d at 33, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
69. McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 331-32, 196 P.2d at 788.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 332, 196 P.2d at 789.
73. Id.
74. Gayle, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 256, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
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tion of the meaning of a "compelling showing." 75 Farley had given
two examples of cases in which the proper showing of invalidity had
resulted in preelection review."6 The Gayle court studied these examples,
Reidman v. Brison" and Mervynne v. Acker," and found that the
focal issues necessary to the resolution of both cases had been deter-
mined previously more than once by the supreme court."9 Consequent-
ly, in Reidman and Brison, a showing of invalidity was found by
using judicial precedent. The Gayle court, applying this principle of
judicial precedent, and giving the traditional deference to an initiative,
refused to find that the showing of invalidity had been made. In the
absence of authoritative case law on which a finding of invalidity
could be based, the court would not entertain the constitutional
challenge to the validity of the airport measure in Gayle.80 The court
reasoned that neither the opponents of the measure nor the indepen-
dent research of the court could produce any dispositive authority
that would allow the court to make a simple and speedy determina-
tion of the validity of the airport issue, unlike the case in McFadden.8
In conclusion, the Gayle decision qualified the "clear showing of
invalidity standard" with the requirement that the invalidity be deter-
mined by existing case law authority. Gayle, therefore, joined both
McFadden and Farley in enunciating this principle. Unfortunately,
in the latest application of the standard in Deukmejian, neither case
law precedent nor express constitutional provisions were included in
the application of the standard by the court. The omission of these
principles perpetuates the vagueness and obscurity of the invalidity
standard.
A. Recent Application
In Legislature v. Deukmejian, the showing of invalidity rested on
a judicially evolved limitation that prohibited the enactment of more
than one valid reapportionment plan in any decade. This limitation
commonly is known as the once-in-a-decade rule.8" The court deter-
mined that the once-in-a-decade limitation not only applies to subse-
quent legislative attempts to reapportion, but also to reapportionment
75. Id. at 255, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
76. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at 327, 431 P.2d at 652, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
77. 217 Cal. 383, 18 P.2d 947 (1933).
78. 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1961).
79. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at 327, 431 P.2d at 652, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
80. Gayle, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 255-58, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 632-34.
81. Id.
82. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 668, 669 P.2d at 22, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
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attempts by initiative, because the limitation is constitutional in
nature. 3 This reasoning seemed, at first blush, to make the invalida-
tion of the initiative analogous to the McFadden case since initiatives
are subject to the provisions of the constitution. 4 In McFadden,
however, the constitutional limitation was stated explicitly in the text
of the constitution. The once-in-a-decade rule, unlike the McFadden
limitation, is created and imposed judicially.85 In article XXI, the
California Constitution provides for reapportionment, but expressly
states that only the legislature shall reapportion after each census.86
No language in the text explicitly states the once-in-a-decade rule or
suggests a limitation of this kind on the initiative power.87 The court,
in articulating the once-in-a-decade rule as a constitutional limitation,
had to rely on the intent of the drafters of the constitution in 1879
to support the conclusion that the constitution precludes reapportion-
ment by initiative or the legislature more than once per decade. 8 The
weakness in this intent argument is that the initiative procesi was not
created until 1911, some thirty-two years after the drafting of the
constitution.8 9 Consequently, the finding by the court that the show-
ing of invalidity was justified by a constitutional limitation is not well
founded, and the historical application of the standard, as evidenced
by McFadden, is not satisfied.
The Deukmejian court also disregarded the second general princi-
ple used in the application of the standard developed by Farley,
McFadden, and Gayle. The court did not cite any dispositive case
authority applying the once-in-a-decade rule to an initiative measure.
The cases cited by the court to support the once-in-a-decade rule were
authority only for the application of the rule to legislative bodies.9 0
If the standard, as it existed before Deukmejian and now the first
prong of a two part test, had been applied strictly to the Sebastiani
Initiative, a preelection review clearly would have been found inap-
propriate. The two major principles in the historical determination
83. Id. at 675, 669 P.2d at 27, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
84. McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 331, 196 P.2d at 788.
85. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 686-88, 669 P.2d at 36-38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 800-02 (Richard-
son, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Article XXI of the California Constitution replaced former article IV, section 6, in
1980. The text of the new article while rephrased, still requires only the legislature to reappor-
tion after every federal census.
88. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 669, 669 P.2d at 22, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
89. Id. at 686, 669 P.2d at 37, 194 Cal. Rptr. 801 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
90. See Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907); Yorty v. Anderson, 60 Cal.
2d 312, 384 P. 2d 417, 33 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1963).
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of a clear showing of invalidity-explicit constitutional provisions and
dispositive case authority-were not satisfied. Additionally, under the
traditional analysis, review of the constitutionality of the measure
would have been deferred until after the election on the initiative had
taken place. The Deukmejian court did not adhere to the historical
application of a clear showing of invalidity. Moreover, the applica-
tion of the newly created second prong of the standard by the Deukme-
jian court raises a serious concern about the effect on the initiative
process of this less" restrained judicial intervention in the preelection
stage of an initiative measure.
ADvERSE EmECTS OF LESS RESTRAINED PREELECTION INTERVENTION
ON THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
The traditional level of judicial deference accorded initiative
measures, and the limited application of the "clear showing of in-
validity" standard used by the California Supreme Court in the past,
indicated the underlying judicial policy that courts are to maximize
and protect the power of the initiative process. During the seventy
years since the inception of the initiative by constitutional amend-
ment in 1911, the initiative process has been proclaimed judicially
to be one of the most precious. rights of our democratic process."
In addition, the policy of the court has maintained that the initiative
power be liberally construed to promote the democratic process.92
Historically, the presence of this pervasive policy has been manifested
in the decisions of the court through restraint in the use of the power
of judicial intervention when presented with a preelection challenge
to an initiative.
Deukmejian, however, has signalled a change in adherence by the
court to this underlying policy. The court, instead of yielding to the
tradition of judicial restraint in considering preelection challenges, chose
to review and invalidate the measure prior to submission to the voters.
This attitude change on the part of the court creates three major con-
cerns for the future of initiative measures.
A. Judicial Frustration of the Initiative Purpose
California created the initiative process in 1911 by constitutional
amendment to provide the electorate with access to the legislative pro-
91. Mervynne, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 563-64, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
92. Id.
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cess after influential lobbyists achieved domination of the legislature.93
Historically, the justification for the importance of the initiative was
that the process would serve as a check on the legislative branch.9 4
If legislators failed to respond to the will of the people, the people
could bypass the legislature and enact laws directly through the in-
itiative process. 95 The initiative has been used successfully to accomplish
reform in many areas, including taxation9 6 and criminal justice." It
also has been upheld as a tool for the people to voice views on public
policy considerations such as the involvement of the United States
in the Vietnam War. 98 While the primary purpose is the enactment
of laws, an important corollary effect of any initiative is the ability
of the electorate to voice concerns not adequately addressed by the
legislature. 99 The facts of the reapportionment struggle that culminated
in Deukmejian exemplify the importance of both the primary pur-
pose and corollary effect of the initiative process and how the deci-
sion of the court defeated both.
As discussed above, after Plan I was rejected by the voters in the
referendum election, Plan II, alleged by opponents to be substantial-
ly similar to the first plan, was enacted as an urgency statute. This
prevented the voters from rejecting Plan II at the polls as they had
rejected Plan I. Effectively, the electorate was precluded from any
participation in the determination of the voting districts to be used
in the state for the rest of the decade.' 0 The only way the voters
could participate or could voice their disapproval of not being able
to participate by the use of the referendum process was through an
initiative.
The decision in Deukmejian prevented the purposes of the initiative
process from being fulfilled. The primary purpose was not fulfilled
because the court, in limiting the initiative process using the once-in-
a-decade rule, prevented the voters from enacting a plan of their own.
Also, voters were prevented from conveying to the elected represen-
93. See Comment, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL.
L. Rav. 922, 922-24 (1975).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Board of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
97. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
98. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d. 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26. In Farley, the supreme
court upheld against a constitutional challenge the right of the voters of San Francisco to pro-
pose and adopt an anti-war resolution.
99. See Comment, supra note 84, at 923-24.
100. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
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tatives their dissatisfaction with the legislative action by casting their
votes in favor of an alternative plan. Notwithstanding that at postelec-
tion invalidation of the Sebastiani Initiative could have occurred using
the same constitutional limitation, a majority vote at the polls for
the initiative and against the legislative plan would have communicated
the displeasure of the electorate to the legislature.
In the area of reapportionment, the decision to exercise judicial
review not only has frustrated this purpose of the Sebastiani Initiative,
but it has made the initiative power to reapportion inferior to that
of the legislature. The court has created a race to reapportion at the
beginning of each decade.""t The winner will be whichever lawmaking
body-the legislature or the people-can succeed in enacting the first
valid reapportionment plan. 0 2 The enactment of a plan by one body
in effect will preclude the other body from also acting because only
one plan per decade is now constitutionally permissible. The
legislature,0 3 however, will always win the race because lengthy time
requirements for proposal of an initiative measure are imposed by
statute.0 4 If, as with Plan II, the governor decides to sign a reappor-
tionment bill into law as an urgency measure, the voters can be pre-
cluded from participation by way of the referendum process as well. I0
The decision in Deukmejian could signal a change in the judicial
policy applied to initiatives in general. If so, the purpose and scope
of the initiative power to counteract legislative action or inaction may
be restricted in future use. In light of the constitutional origin of
the initiative power, any restriction would seem to be made more ap-
propriately, not by the judicial process, but by constitutional amend-
ment. The judiciary, however, can effect changes in the treatment
by the courts of initiative measures to make review more predictable.
B. Predictability of Preelection Review
The traditional treatment by the court of initiative measures made
the risk of preelection review for constitutional validity a minimal
one. In the past thirty-six years, only once prior to Deukmejian, in
McFadden, has a duly qualified statewide initiative measure been
101. Brief for Respondent at 18, Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17,
194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
102. Id.
103. The decision in Deukmejian held that only one valid plan, whatever the source, will
be permitted.
104. See CAL. ELEC. CODE, §§3500-3579.
105. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §8 (urgency statutes are effective immediately upon the signing
of the bill by the governor and no referendum is allowed).
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removed from the ballot. 0 6 In all other cases of constitutional
challenges, the court has deferred review until after the election.
This policy of restraint made the process of preelection review predic-
table. Basically, the drafters of any reasonable initiative proposed and
qualified could anticipate presentation of the measure to the voters
at the polls. Reasonable initiatives could be defined as those measures
not contrary to express constitutional provisions or judicial precedent.
One example of an unreasonable initiative measure would be an
attempt to revise the constitution by the initiative process, as in
McFadden. "7 Another example would be an initiative that did not
comply with the specific constitutional provisions for an initiative
measure. One of these constitutional rules is found in article II of
the California Constitution and prohibits an initiative containing more
than one subject from being submitted to the voters.' 8
Proponents of initiatives before the Deukmejian decision rarely had
to calculate among the risks involved in their proposal the risk of
judicial intervention that would prevent submission to the voters.
Deukmejian, however, by lowering the deference given initiatives and
by placing more reliance on the application of the standard of review,
increases the risk of litigation and judicial intervention at the preelec-
tion stage. This increase in risk may deter the full use of the initiative
power. The failure of the courts to rely on case law in determining
a clear showing of invalidity gives no guidance to proponents as to
the risks of preelection litigation. Those proponents with novel ideas
may hesitate to propose them or may modify them to come within
any possible legislative limitation that could be applied by the court.
In essence, the increased risk of preelection review may have a chill-
ing effect on the process and result in a decrease of the free use of
the initiative process to solve governmental problems. In addition,
another undesirable effect of preelection review is an increase of fact
finding made at the appellate level.
C. Increased Determinations of Factual Disputes at the
Appellate Level
The policy of less restrained judicial intervention during the preelec-
tion stages of the initiative process, as signalled by the Deukmejian
106. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 681, 669 P.2d at 33, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
107. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
108. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). See generally, Comment, The California Initiative
Process: The Demise of the Single Subject Rule, 14 PAC. L.J. 1095, 1099 (1983). The single
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decision, will increase the number of measures reviewed in an ap-
pellate forum. Previously, when the review of a measure was defer-
red until after the election, the factual determinations were made in
the setting of a trial court" 9 either because actions were filed in the
trial courts or were referred there by appellate courts. The actions
proceeded up the normal legal channels."' This is a desirable pro-
cedure because the trial setting, unlike an appellate forum, is design-
ed for the fact finding process.' However, because of the urgent
nature of preelection challenges to initiative review, most preelection
challenges are brought directly in appellate courts as writ proceedings.
As more measures are shifted from a postelection review to a preelec-
tion review, the inevitable result will be greater instances of factual
determinations at the appellate level. The undesirability of this shift
can be better understood if the legal framework of a preelection
challenge and the existing judicial attitude toward fact finding at the
appellate level are examined briefly.
1. The Judicial Framework of a Preelection Challenge to an
Initiative Measure
A preelection challenge to the validity of an initiative measure is
raised by bringing an action in equity." 2 The equitable remedy sought
is the issuance of a writ of mandate by the court to compel ministerial
officers, in this case election officials, to submit or withhold the in-
itiative from the voters." 3 The petition for writ of mandate can be
brought in an appellate forum as an original proceeding because of
the equitable nature of the action.'1
The party seeking the equitable relief files a petition for the writ
of mandate."' 5 Opponents to the writ, the respondents, file a return
or answer that may include factual allegations supporting their view." 6
The factual allegations in the return must be accepted as true unless
controverted by the petitioners." 7 If the petitioners do present counter
subject rule is an explicit constitutional limitation on the initiative. This rule has been used
often to challenge initiative measures.
109. See Morris v. South San Joaquin Ir. Dist., 9 Cal. 2d 701, 704, 72 P.2d 154, 156 (1937).
110. Id.
111. See McCarthy v. Talley, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 581, 297 P.2d 981, 984 (1956).
112. See Yorty v. Anderson, 60 Cal. 2d 312, 317, 384 P.2d 417, 420, 33 Cal. Rptr. 97,
100 (1963).
113. Id.
114. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §1085.
115. Id.
116. Id. §1089.
117. Lotus Car Ltd. v. Municipal Court, 263 Cal. App. 2d 264, 268, 69 Cal. Rptr. 384,
387 (1968).
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allegations, a question of fact arises."1 8 The discretionary powers of
the court sitting in equity include the ability to make factual deter-
minations in the dispute necessary to the decision.' 19 Any question
of fact raised by the answer is heard in the same manner as any other
trial, and findings of fact on the part of the court are required unless
waived by the parties.' 20 Appellate courts, however, are not equipped
to try issues of fact.' Precedent in California, acknowledging this
inadequacy of fact finding at the appellate level, has exhibited a
preference that appellate courts are not the appropriate forums for
the resolution of disputed fact issues.' 22
2. Existing Judicial Attitude Toward Factual Determinations
at the Appellate Level
This preference for the avoidance of factual resolution in a court
of review is evidenced by the attitude of the supreme court in one
of the few cases in which the power to make factual determinations
at the appellate level was exercised. The decision, Mooney v. Pickett,'23
limited the use of the discretionary fact finding power by the court
to the specific facts of the case. In Mooney, a 1971 supreme court
case, a petition for mandamus was made to compel county officials
to grant general assistance welfare payments to unemployable single
men.' 24 The court denied the respondents' request in the mandamus
proceeding for a factual hearing, but nevertheless made original factual
findings in the decision.' 25
Three grounds were given for the propriety of the exercise of the
fact finding power. First, the case involved the eligibility of a group
of needy people for general welfare assistance.' 26 Second, the
respondents requesting the factual hearing had already been given an
opportunity for resolution of the factual questions in a separate but
related suit in the superior court. 27 Third, the respondents did not
repudiate the stipulations of facts made in the lower court and re-
quest a factual hearing at the earliest opportunity in the appellate
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 5 B. Wrmrm, CAIFORIA PROCEDuRE, Extra-Ordinary Writs, §167 (2nd ed. 1971).
122. Id.
123. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
124. Id. at 670, 483 P.2d at 1232, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 682-83, 483 P.2d at 1240-41, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89.
127. Id.
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court.'28 The court reasoned that a factual finding by an appellate
court under these circumstances was not unfair. 29 This, however, was
not the attitude taken by the Deukmejian court in addressing the com-
plex factual questions presented by the reapportionment fight.
3. Issues of Disputed Fact in Deukmejian
The factual disputes in Deukmejian centered around the validity
of both the initiative and legislative reapportionment plan. The pro-
ponents of the initiative charged the legislative plan was invalid, and
the proponents of the legislative plan charged the initiative plan was
invalid. 3 ' The once-in-a-decade rule could not be applied to limit the
initiative measure unless the court factually held that the legislative
plan was valid. If the plan was proper, then a valid plan had been
enacted for the decade and any other attempts to reapportion were
precluded. If the plan was found to be invalid, however, the con-
stitutional limitation would not apply and the Sebastiani Initiative could
be submitted to the voters.
The major factual dispute arose in conjunction with the determina-
tion of the validity of the legislative plan by the court. The respondents,
in opposing the petition for the writ of mandate, presented factual
allegations that the plan was invalid.' Because allegations in the
answer are presumed to be true,'32 the court had only two choices:
(1) proceed upon the assumption that the legislative plan was invalid,
or (2) assume that the petitioners disputed the answer, in which case
issues of fact were created, the determination of which would be
necessary to the decision by the court.
The factual issues involved complex constitutional requirements for
reapportionment. Among the questions raised were the following: (1)
whether the plan adopted by the legislature had excessive population
deviations, (2) whether the plan diluted minority voting strength by
splitting minority communities, and (3) whether the plan violated ar-
ticle XXI of the California Constitution because the districts created
were not contiguous and compact, or because the plan unnecessarily
divided cities and counties.133
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 664-65, 669 P.2d at 19-20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84.
131. Brief for Respondents at 31-42, Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d
17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781.
132. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
133. Brief for Respondents at 31-42, Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d
17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781.
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The traditional options for resolving factual disputes were available
to the court. Since the validity of the legislative plan was already
the subject of a pending unrelated suit in federal district court,13 ' the
supreme court could have deferred any resolution of the case until
that court had made the factual findings. A second option would have
been to send the case to a state trial court to make the factual find-
ings. Thirdly, the court could have appointed a referee to hold a fac-
tual hearing.' 35 The respondent in the case had requested a hearing
in the answer.' 36 A last alternative, not supported by precedent, would
have been for the supreme court to make original fact findings. This
would be the least desirable of the three options available to the court
because of the complex nature of the factual questions involved. In
addition, none of the factors given by the court in the Mooney deci-
sion was present to justify the action.' 37
The supreme court, indirectly, did use the last alternative. The court
held that the legislative plan was valid, in essence determining that
the factual allegations of the respondents were not true. This was
accomplished by finding that the legislative plan was presumptively
valid. ' 38 This irrebuttable presumption of validity arose, according to
the supreme court, simply because the law had been duly enacted.,39
The result of this finding by the court was to prevent the initiative
proponents from factually defending the measure.
In addition to the apparent unfairness in denying the litigants the
right to a trial-like factual determination, a second objection can be
made. By giving the plan enacted by the legislature a presumption
of validity, despite respondents' factual allegations to the contrary,
the court prevented the initiative measure from having the same chance
as the legislative plan to obtain an identical presumption at the polls.
If the initiative measure had been enacted into law at the polls, then
in any subsequent suit, both the legislative and the initiative plans
would have the benefit of the presumption of validity accorded a duly
enacted law. In those circumstances, any challenge to either measure
would have to be decided on the merits and not on the fact that
one plan had had the opportunity to be enacted and the other did
not. To allow the use of a legislative presumption of validity to pre-
134. Id. at 31.
135. Holt v. Kelly, 20 Cal. 3d 560, 562, 574 P.2d 441, 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627 (1978).
136. Brief for Respondents at 33, Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d
17, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
137. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
138. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 678, 669 P.2d at 29, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
139. Id.
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vent an initiative plan from gaining the same presumption results in
the power of the initiative being subordinated to that of the legislature,
which is contrary to constitutional allocation of power.
This use of the legislative presumption to limit the initiative pro-
cess, again, signals a change in policy on the part of the present court
in finding preelection review proper. This change in attitude will im-
pact substantially on the future use of the initiative power. Among
the undesirable effects of less restrained intervention in the preelec-
tion stage will be an increase in judicial frustration of the purpose
for which the initiative was created. 14 0 Additionally, the predictability
of judicial review in constitutional challenges will decrease,' and the
number of factual determinations at the appellate level will increase."
Because of these negative effects, tie parameters of preelection review
need to be redefined to ensure the continued vitality of the initiative
power.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Deukmejian court considered the consequences that would result
if a review of the constitutionality of the measure were not held before
the submission of the measure to the voters. The two consequences
were as follows: (1) the substaitial cost of the special election to the
taxpayers, and (2) the problems that candidates and election officials
would face in preparing for the election without knowing which reap-
portionment plan would be in effect.'4 3 The court, however, could
have mitigated these results effectively without proceeding with the
preelection review. Both of these consequences would have been
avoided if the court had removed the measure from the special elec-
tion ballot, in effect cancelling the costly election, and ordered the
apportionment plans of the legislature to be used temporarily for the
1984 elections. The initiative could have been placed on the ballot
at the regular election in June 1984 and the initiative reapportion-
ment plans, if approved, could have been used beginning in 1986.
The court should avoid preelection reviews when possible, and if
alternatives can be used, they should be implemented. The mitigation
of consequences instead of preelection invalidation will allow the in-
itiative process to proceed with as little judicial intervention as possi-
ble. The court, however, still could grant a preelection review in those
140. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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instances in which the consequences are very serious and no means
to avoid them exist.
Additionally, to reduce the need for preelection review the court
also should make the process more predictable.' 4 This could be ac-
complished by adoption of the general principles set out in McFad-
den and Gayle. The McFadden principle, invalidation only upon a
violation of an express constitutional provision, would allow initiative
proponents to use the constitution as a guide in planning the measures.
The Gayle principle,'"5 invalidation only if supported by precedent,
would allow the proponents to use case law as a guide in formulating
and drafting initiatives. This would result in a predictable application
of the equitable power of the court and allow the initiative power
to be maximized. Finally, the court should defer until after the elec-
tion review of any measure when the showing of invalidity rests on
factual issues.' 46 This would ensure the proponents of the measure
will have a complete and fair factual determination in an appropriate
forum, the trial court, because the appellate courts will have the time
to send the cases there.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Deukmejian, if given full effect in future cases,
will increase judicial intervention during the preelection stage of the
initiative process. The traditional attitude of judicial restraint in grant-
ing preelection reviews was qualified to allow the court to consider
special circumstances surrounding the particular initiative measure at
issue. If the court finds that the circumstances may result in serious
consequences, then the level of deference accorded the initiative pro-
cess is lowered. By this qualification, the court has abandoned the
traditional application of the Gayle clear showing of invalidity stan-
dard and the case law principles that clarified how a clear showing
of invalidity was determined. The Gayle standard, incorporating the
ideas of both the McFadden and Farley cases, required that opponents
of an initiative measure seeking preelection review make a showing
to the court that the measure, if enacted, would be invalid. In deter-
mining the propriety of a preelection review prior to the Deukmejian
decision, courts relied heavily on the policy of according initiative
measures high levels of judicial deference. In addition, two general
144. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
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principles evolved from the McFadden, Farley and Gayle decisions
to guide the courts in determining whether the requisite showing of
invalidity had been made. First, a clear showing could be made only
if the invalidity was based on an explicit limitation in the constitu-
tion. Second, the authority for any showing of invalidity must have
come from case law in which the limitation previously had been ap-
plied to an initiative measure.
The Gayle clear showing of invalidity standard was applied by the
supreme court in Brosnahan. The Brosnahan decision gave no reason-
ing or guidance on the application or fulfillment of the standard.
Deukmejian, citing Brosnahan as authority, qualified the standard into
a two prong test. The first prong is the traditional highly deferential
standard that will be used in the absence of any special circumstances.
The second prong, used to invalidate the initiative measure in Deukme-
jian, allows the court to consider any special circumstances that will
result in consequences the court finds detrimental. The consequences
the court found serious enough to lower the level of deference in
Deukmejian were the cost of the special election and the disruption
of the political system.
The outcome of the Deukmejian decision will be an increase in the
number of preelection reviews granted by the court. This author has
demonstrated that as more reviews are shifted from a postelection
trial setting to the preelection appellate forum, the effect will be
threefold. First, the purposes behind the initiative power will be
frustrated. Second, preelection judicial intervention will not be predic-
table, and third, more factual determinations will be made at the ap-
pellate level. These consequences will result in a decrease in the power
of the initiative. To counter this effect, the court should return to
a strict standard of review that includes the high level of deference
given the initiatives process in the past. This standard should base
the showing of invalidity on an express constitutional provision or
existing case law and in the presence of serious consequences, the
court should seek mitigating alternatives. If this is done, instead of
lowering the level of deference from the high traditional level and
granting preelection review based on whatever the court deems to be
a serious consequence, the future vitality of the initiative process in
California will be ensured.
Melissa Collins
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